The economic recovery—America's investment problem by James Bullard
        ccording to the National Bureau of
           Economic Research, the Great Reces-
sion officially began during the fourth 
quarter of 2007 (December 2007) and ended 
during the second quarter of 2009 (June 
2009).  Subsequently, the U.S. economy 
has recovered slowly, despite many policy 
actions aimed at stimulating economic activ-
ity.  Given the financial crisis, as well as the 
apparent real estate bubble and its subsequent 
collapse during the 2000s, the pace of the 
recovery is not surprising, especially when 
one looks at investment data.  This raises 
questions about how we should be evaluating 
the current economy’s performance.
If we define recovery as real (i.e., inflation-
adjusted) gross domestic product (GDP) hav-
ing surpassed its previous peak level, which 
happened in the third quarter of 2011, then 
the economy has recovered from the reces-
sion.  Most of the major components of real 
GDP have also recovered to their levels dur-
ing the previous peak.  On the consumption 
side, real personal consumption expenditures 
are actually higher now than they have ever 
been.  In addition, real government expen-
ditures are higher than their 2007:Q4 level, 
despite the fact that state and local govern-
ment spending has been declining in recent 
years.  Real exports are higher as well, while 
real imports are roughly the same as they 
were in 2007:Q4.  
The glaring exception in the recovery, how-
ever, involves the path of investment spending.  
Real private investment remains roughly  
16 percent below its level during the previous 
business cycle peak.  If investment had recov-
ered to the extent that consumption has, GDP 
would have been an estimated 4.4 percent (or 
nearly $670 billion in current dollars) higher 
in 2011:Q3 than the actual data show.
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Within investment, the components that 
have not recovered are those related to real 
estate.  In 2011:Q3, real private residential 
investment (the housing side) was 38 percent 
lower and real private nonresidential invest-
ment in structures (the commercial side) was 
28 percent lower than their 2007:Q4 levels.  
These two components declined during the 
2007-09 recession and have simply remained 
low.  Real investment in equipment and soft-
ware, on the other hand, was 2 percent higher 
in 2011:Q3 than its previous peak level.  Col-
lectively, these data support the view that a 
real estate bubble collapsed.
The U.S. economy experienced overin-
vestment in housing that was driven to a 
significant degree by beliefs that housing 
prices would continue to rise.  As a result, 
too many resources were allocated to the 
housing sector, creating a bubble that lasted 
from roughly 2001 to 2007.  The effects were 
not limited to the housing sector, though; 
extra resources also went to businesses 
that support that sector, such as those in 
manufacturing, transportation and retail.  
Consequently, GDP temporarily grew more 
rapidly during this period than it otherwise 
would have.  The rapid growth was ultimately 
unsustainable:  The bubble burst and led to a 
large recession.  
In the aftermath of the collapsed bubble, 
it is not reasonable to expect economic 
output and, in particular, the components 
of investment related to housing to return 
quickly to their previous business cycle peak 
levels.  Because of the overinvestment during 
the 2000s, the U.S. economy now has high 
inventories of houses and commercial real 
estate.  Given this overabundance, it will take 
time and economic growth before substantial 
amounts of new investment in houses and 
commercial real estate occur.  
In general, 2007:Q4 should not be used 
as the benchmark for where the economy is 
supposed to be now, precisely because part 
of the economic activity during the previous 
decade was due to artificial growth driven 
by a bubble.  A more appropriate assessment 
of today’s economic performance would 
focus on underlying trend growth, thereby 
excluding growth caused by the bubble.  To 
illustrate, real GDP grew at an annual rate of 
2.7 percent per quarter, on average, during 
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the 2002-07 expansion.  The nonbubble trend 
growth rate during that period would have 
been lower—for instance, 2.4 percent.  This 
is the average growth rate since the Great 
Recession ended; thus, it does not include 
a real estate bubble.  Many analyses simply 
compare today’s economy to where it would 
be had it continued to grow at the higher rate.  
It would be more appropriate, however, to 
compare today’s economy to one that grew 
steadily at the lower, nonbubble trend rate.  
The latter comparison may still indicate 
that economic output remains below its 
potential, but it would not be as far below as 
the former would suggest.  Which compari-
son is used has important implications for 
monetary policy.  Moreover, policymakers 
must be careful not to reinflate the bubble 
because, as we have seen, such growth is not 
sustainable and can lead to poor economic 
outcomes upon its collapse.
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